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Abstract 
In “On Drawing Lines on a Map” (Smith, 1995) I suggested that the different ways 
we have of drawing lines on maps opens up a new perspective on ontology, resting 
on a distinction between two sorts of boundaries: fiat and bona fide. ‘Fiat’ means, 
roughly: human-demarcation-induced. ‘Bona fide’ means, again roughly: a 
boundary constituted by some real physical discontinuity. I presented a general 
typology of boundaries based on this opposition, and showed how it generates a 
corresponding typology of the different sorts of objects which boundaries 
determine or demarcate. In this paper I describe how the theory of fiat boundaries 
has evolved since 1995, how it has been applied in areas such as property law and 
political geography, and how it is being used in contemporary work in formal and 
applied ontology, especially within the framework of Basic Formal Ontology. 
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1. Introduction 
In “On Drawing Lines on a Map” (Smith, 1995) I described an approach to 
ontology of reality resting on the thesis that extended entities can have boundaries 
of two different sorts. On the one hand there are what we might call bona fide 
boundaries, which correspond to physical discontinuities of the sort illustrated by 
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coastlines or the surface of your skin.1 On the other hand are fiat boundaries, 
which are boundaries introduced in the absence of physical discontinuities, for 
example the boundary of Utah or the boundary through your body separating your 
upper from your lower torso.  
The idea of such a distinction was inspired by the theory of boundaries and 
the continuum sketched in Brentano (1988) and in Chisholm (1989). Both 
Brentano and Chisholm recognized that there is something problematic in treating 
a continuum as a collection (set, class, aggregate) of non-continuous points or 
elements. Each continuum is, rather, ontologically prior to the boundaries or cuts 
that we may make within its interior. Such cuts are, by definition, not present in 
the continuum itself. Rather, they are added, for example through an act of 
demarcation. A formal theory of boundaries and the continuum was developed in 
this light in my paper in the Chisholm volume of the Library of Living 
Philosophers (Smith 1997), and this led in turn to the formal theory of bona fide 
and fiat boundaries presented in Smith and Varzi (1997, 2000).  
Fiat boundaries may lie entirely skew to all boundaries of the bona fide sort 
(as in the case of the boundaries of Utah and Wyoming). They may also (as in the 
case of the boundaries of Indiana and Pennsylvania) involve a combination of fiat 
and bona fide portions; or they may be constructed entirely out of bona fide 
portions which, because they are not themselves intrinsically connected, must be 
conjoined via a fiat boundary (Smith, 2007).  
Once fiat boundaries have been recognized, we can apply the fiat-bona fide 
dichotomy also to the corresponding (bounded) entities.2 Fiat entities – as for 
example in the case of parcels of real estate – are distinguished by the fact that 
they exist only because certain fiat boundaries exist. In some cases, this will reflect 
some specific human decision. In other cases a fiat boundary will exist not in 
virtue of some specific human decision but rather in reflection of the physical 
properties of the object itself.3 That fiat part of a mountain which is above 500 feet 
above sea level exists independently of any specific contour map, and 
independently of the institution of contour maps. 
We can draw fiat boundaries also in the temporal realm to yield fiat processes: 
the Renaissance, the Millennium, the Second World War, the Reagan Years, my 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Thomas Bittner, Berit Brogaard, Roberto Casati, David Mark, Alan 
Ruttenberg, Andrew Turk, Achille Varzi, Laure Vieu, Lars Vogt, and Wojciech Zelaniec for many 
helpful contributions.  
2 On the use of ‘fiat entity’ rather than ‘fiat object’ see the section on Basic Formal Ontology, 
below. 
3 In a series of papers, beginning with (Vogt, et al., 2011), Lars Vogt and his collaborators 
have presented a powerful critique of the conception of fiat boundaries as originally formulated in 
“On Drawing Lines on a Map”, emphasizing above all the need to modify the assumption that fiat 
boundaries go hand in hand in every case with human decision or demarcation. 
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childhood, and so forth. All of these are perfectly objective sub-totalities within 
the totality of all processes making up the history of the universe, even though the 
spatial reach, as well as the initial and terminal boundaries of, for example, the 
Second World War were decided (in different ways) by fiat. 
The examples of fiat entities mentioned above are all cases where proper parts 
are delineated or carved out (by fiat) within the interiors of larger bona fide 
wholes. They are examples of entities created by moving from the top (or middle) 
down. But we can also proceed from the bottom up, by constructing higher-level 
fiat objects out of lower-level bona fide objects as parts. This is because, while 
bona fide entities such as tables, apples, persons, planets, are unitary and thus 
connected, fiat entities may be scattered; they may be such as to include separate 
bona fide objects as parts (Smith 1999). Polynesia is a geographical example of 
this sort; other examples might be: the Polish nobility, the constellation Orion, or 
the species cat. Such higher-order fiat object aggregates may themselves be 
unified together into further fiat entities (say: the Union of Pacific Island Nations). 
The fiat boundaries to which higher-order fiat entities owe their existence are the 
mereological sums of the (fiat and bona fide) outer boundaries of their respective 
lower-order constituents.4 
2. Fiats Perceptual and Ecological 
Are entities of these fiat sorts of ontological significance? Can basic principles of 
metaphysics really turn on the rather elaborate beliefs and conventions that human 
beings have evolved in relation to place, space and politico-administrative 
jurisdiction? To see why these questions must be answered in the positive, 
consider what happens when two political entities (nations, counties) or two 
parcels of real estate lie adjacent to one another. The entities in question are then 
said to share a common boundary. This sharing of a common boundary is a 
peculiarity of the fiat world. For when two bona fide objects converge upon each 
other, for example people shaking hands, then what happens physically in the area 
of apparent contact has to do first of all with a compacting of molecules on either 
side, and ultimately with aggregates of sub-atomic particles whose location and 
whose belongingness to either one or other of the two bodies are only statistically 
specifiable. Genuine coincidence of bona fide boundaries is thus impossible, if 
‘coincidence’ means: identity of spatiotemporal location.5 To see what is involved 
here we note first of all that in the geographical realm (or in other words on the 
geographic level of granularity) – for example in the geographic region where a 
                                                 
4 Compare Bittner and Smith (2001, 2003, 2003a) on the theory of granular partitions. 
5 Details are provided in Smith and Varzi (2000), which sets forth the formal differences between 
the coincidence of boundaries in the fiat realm and the mere proximity of boundaries which is 
achievable in the realm of physical bodies. 
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coastal territory meets the sea – we draw fiat boundaries, even though that are 
delineated not by sharp outer boundaries but rather by boundary-like regions 
which are to some degree indeterminate. The boundary between two hands in a 
handshake is a boundary of this sort. 
We can draw in this connection on the work on visual perception of the 
ecological psychologist J. J. Gibson, who takes as his starting point not internal 
visual imagines nor retinal excitations but rather the entities out there in the world 
which are the targets of perception. As Gibson writes:  
We are tempted to assume … that we live in a physical world consisting of bodies in space 
and that what we perceive consists of objects in space. But this is very dubious. The terrestrial 
environment is better described in terms of a medium, substances, and the surfaces that 
separate them (Gibson 1979: 16). 
Here substances are stuffs – rock, soil, sand, oil, wood, the tissues of animals. 
They are all more or less resistant to deformation and penetration by solid bodies 
and more or less permanent in shape, and they are all generally opaque. Media, in 
contrast, such as air and water, are relatively insubstantial, and solid bodies can 
move through them without much resistance. Surfaces, finally, separate media 
from substances and they separate substances from each other where they come 
into contact (Stroll, 1988: 126)  
The combinations of medium, substances and surfaces that we experience 
exhibit what Gibson calls ‘affordances’, which he defines as ‘what the 
environment offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, whether for good or 
ill’ (1979: 127), as a chair affords sitting, a staircase affords climbing, or an angry 
bear affords fleeing. 
Affordances involve in every case a combination of bona fide and fiat entities. 
A fiat boundarie is created when a light casts a shadow across a part of your cave, 
or when an animal looks up as you cross into its territory. Affordances may 
involve what we might call negative entities – holes, cavities, openings (Casati and 
Varzi 1994). A tunnel, for example, is bounded physically by its walls, floor and 
roof; at its entrance and exit, however, it must make do with fiat boundaries. There 
is a tunnel through your body that passes from the oesophagus through the 
stomach and on to the small and large intestines. These various parts of the tunnel 
are separated in virtue of bona fide boundaries founded in the different 
microscopic structures of the different portions of the tunnel lining. But the tunnel 
itself is continuous, and so the boundaries separating the successive subtunnels 
within the tunnel are fiat in nature. 
Varzi (2017) presents the ingredients of a view according to which reality is 
one single continuum, so that all boundaries are fiat in the sense that all boundaries 
are human induced. A more extreme view would have it that no entities are fiat in 
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nature. Rather, our talk of what we are here calling ‘fiat entities’ is, precisely, talk 
and thus of no further ontological significance. Some friends of what we might 
think of as ‘ultimate physics’ hold that there are bona fide objects – ultimate atoms 
of reality – but that these exist on a level way beneath our everyday ken. They 
would thus reject candidate meso- and macroscale bona fide objects such as 
people and planets, viewing these, again, as a matter of mere façons de parler.6 
 
3. The Linguistic Windowing of Reality 
There are also fiat entities which arise specifically in virtue of the groupings and 
refinings which are involved in our use and understanding of language. This 
occurs in a two-fold process. On the one hand, linguistic entities such as spoken 
words and sentences are themselves processes demarcated in fiat fashion out of 
concrete sound-material that is in itself not cleanly separated out into linguistic 
units via discontinuities in the flow of sound. In addition, the flow of sound and of 
sound production is fused in one or other way with underlying mental and 
neurological accompaniments. On the other hand, external reality, too, is tailored, 
or pared down by fiat, in order that it will fit our linguistically generated windows 
of salience. Thus if I say, truly, ‘John built mud pies in the sand’, then the real-
world target of my utterance is a certain portion of reality7 involving John, some 
sand, a complex plurality whose constituent unitary parts are comprehended 
through the phrase ‘mud pie’. If I say, truly, ‘John shocked Mary’, then the real-
world correlate of the verb of this sentence is a complex dynamic affair (a fiat 
process, or what is elsewhere called a ‘process profile’ (Smith, 2012)) that is 
comprehended through the transitive verb ‘shock’. Participants in the process 
involve John, Mary, some utterance or gesture on the part of John, and some 
mental process on the part of Mary that is caused by this utterance or gesture and 
has both Mary and John as its targets. 
The way in which natural language contributes to the generation of fiat 
boundaries can be illustrated in relation to the correlated linguistic phenomena of 
mass versus count and verbal aspect (Galton, 1984; Mourelatos, 1981).  
When I point towards a cattlefield and assert ‘there is cattle over there’, then 
the target of my assertion differs from my target when I assert ‘there are cows over 
there’. The underlying real bovine material is in both cases the same, but I impose 
different sorts of boundaries on this material in the two cases.  
Verbal aspect has to do with the ‘internal temporal constituency’ of the events 
                                                 
6 See Davies (2018) on the metaphysical implications of the fiat/bona fide distinction. 
7 Ceusters & Smith, 2015. 
6 
towards which our empirical judgments are directed (Comrie 1976). Consider the 
concrete factual material that is John kissing Mary on a given occasion. In this 
factual material, here again fiat boundaries can come to be drawn by language in a 
variety of ways. It can be comprehended as: ‘John is kissing Mary’, ‘John is 
repeatedly kissing Mary’, ‘Mary is constantly being kissed by John’, ‘Mary has 
been being constantly kissed by John since 1884’, and so on (Thomsen and Smith, 
2018). 
Such carving out of linguistic fiat objects is in part a matter of simple 
grouping together, for example, through the use of plural referring expressions 
such as ‘Hannah and her sisters’ or ‘Siouxsie and the Banshees’ (Ojeda 1993). But 
it is in part also a matter of windowing or foregrounding (Talmy 1996). If I point 
to a group of irregularly shaped bumps in the sand and say ‘dunes’, then the real-
world correlate of my expression is a complex plurality (a higher-order fiat object 
with non-crisp boundaries) divided, via the general type dune, into constituent 
non-crisply delineated parts (Smith 1987). Cognitive linguists such as Talmy 
(1995, 1996) and Langacker (1987/1991) have rightly emphasized the degree to 
which language effects subtle articulations of this sort. 
Another variety of fiat boundary-creation is effected through our use of 
expressions such as ‘this’ and ‘that’ in relation to objects in space. This involves in 
each case the drawing of a transient, imaginary boundary, lying in the region in 
front of the speaker, which is such that the objects labeled ‘this’ and ‘that’ lie on 
opposing sides of the boundary. The use of ‘here’, similarly, involves the creation 
of an ephemeral fiat boundary comprehending a roughly spherical volume of space 
around the speaker, a volume whose size, shape and location, and sometimes also 
degree of crispness (Smith and Brogaard, 2003) are contextually determined. 
Transient boundary-creation of this sort is effected in the same way independently 
of order of magnitude, from the tiniest (‘this flea’) to the grossest (‘that empire,’ 
‘that galaxy’). 
As Talmy has shown (1995), boundaries are at work also in cases of the 
following sort: 
I offered Agnes the book [creates a virtual sphere around the recipient]. 
She accepted the book [Agnes allows the sphere to be broken]. 
She rejected the book [Agnes maintains the sphere unbroken]. 
which involve the creation of non-physical paths and boundaries of a range of 
different sorts. 
 It is important to realize that the fiat boundaries drawn in cases such as this 
are drawn in the world of bona fide objects. While it is true that all objects which 
we grasp linguistically are grasped through our linguistically expressed concepts, 
we should not move from there to: all objects which we grasp linguistically exist 
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only in virtue of our linguistically expressed concepts.8 
Everyday objects and processes are described by cognitive linguists such as 
Talmy (1995) and Lakoff (1987) as existing in the ‘conceptual realm’. Even space 
itself is often described by Talmy as a mere ‘conceptual domain’ in a way that 
implies that, in the absence of concept-using subjects like ourselves, space would 
not exist. What I am proposing here, however, is that the fiat boundaries induced 
through natural language are of a piece with geographical fiat boundaries. This 
makes it clear how Talmy’s position is to be corrected: the fiat boundaries to 
which reference is constantly made in our natural language utterances are not in 
any sense in our heads, or in some conceptual sphere. Rather, they are out there in 
the world. They are not, however, physical in nature. Rather, they are analogous to 
other ephemeral socio-cultural formations – such as debts, claims, bank balances – 
entities which are parts of what Frege would call ‘objective’ reality, yet not such 
as to fall within the domain of physical science (Frege 1884: Ch. 1). 
And now, if some fiat boundaries – like the borders of nations or postal 
districts – are social entities in this sense, then like the latter they will be subject to 
legal regulations. When the legal system takes up into its orbit a vaguely bounded 
region (a wetland) or vaguely bounded processes (for example the process of 
dying) then it characteristically adds a rule that is designed to make the relevant 
boundary precise. Private property in some jurisdictions extends to the mean low 
water mark, and for any coastal portion of the United States or Canada there is 
some legal definition based on mean low, high, average, etc. tide level, as to where 
private property stops and a commons starts. Definitions are needed also as to how 
such determinations apply when boundaries cross the mouths of rivers. If the legal 
system needs to know where the shoreline is in order to regulate access, then it 
will need to pick some particular stage in the tidal cycle, such as mean low tide 
level; it thus creates a fiat shoreline that is fixed and reasonably crisp, and this 
exists as it were alongside the bona fide shoreline that moves with the tides. You 
cannot see or touch or trip over the fiat shoreline; but the fiat shoreline is there, 
nonetheless, as a part of reality: if you cross it, you will be fined. 
4. Truthmakers as Fiat Objects 
We can now expand our treatment of linguistically generated fiat boundaries to 
throw light on the notion of truth as classically understood in terms of a 
correspondence between a judgment or assertion on the one hand and a certain 
portion of reality on the other. Reality does not, of course, come ready-parceled 
into judgment-shaped portions that are predisposed to stand in relations of 
correspondence of the given sort. The discipline of logical semantics has thus 
                                                 
8 Stove calls the argument in favor of views of this ‘the gem’. See his (1991). 
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tended to treat, not of truth as such (truth to reality), but rather of truth in a model, 
where the model is a specially constructed set-theoretic reality-surrogate. The 
theory of fiat boundaries can help us to avoid the need for this resort to surrogates 
by allowing us to treat judgment itself as a sui generis variety of drawing fiat 
boundaries.  
True judgments effect a drawing of boundaries that is successful in the sense 
that it does not conflict with reality. The resultant boundaries themselves are 
drawn, as already described, in the extended world of genuine objects and 
associated processes. The fiat entities they circumscribe are typically many-sorted: 
they include both objects and processes (as the correspondent sentences include 
both nouns and verbs). Such entities are on the one hand autonomous: that region 
of reality through which the given boundary is drawn – for example the complex 
of objects and processes which are involved in John’s kissing Mary – exists in and 
of itself, regardless of our judging activity, and so do all its constituent sub-
regions. The whole itself is however also in a certain sense dependent on our 
judgment. For in the absence of the judging activity through which the drawing of 
the fiat boundary is effected, a portion of reality of just this sort would in no way 
be demarcated from its surroundings. Judgment-shaped portions of reality can in 
this way exist in reality objectively, and to be precisely tailored to make our 
judgments true, but they are fiat rather than bona fide in nature.  
There is, as Talmy puts it, a windowing of reality that is effected by our uses 
of language, especially of those descriptive uses of language which are involved 
when we make true empirical judgments. The ephemeral fiat boundaries effected 
through declarative sentences are analogous to the ephemeral boundaries of the 
visual fields associated with our acts of visual perception as described in (Smith, 
1999b). Veridical judgments stand to those portions of reality which are their fiat 
judgment-correlates as acts of perception stand to their associated visual fields.  
Each true empirical judgment can be seen as effecting a division of reality in 
fiat fashion in such a way as to mark out a certain truthmaking region consisting of 
those entities that are relevant to the truth of the judgment in question. Truth itself 
can then be defined as the relation of correspondence between a judgment and its 
corresponding truthmaking region, and a true judgment is in this sense analogous 
to a map of the corresponding portion of geographic reality.9 A view of truth along 
these lines rests on an account of the windowing of reality via language that is of a 
piece with the ecological account of perceptual windowing advanced by Gibson.  
5. Fiat Boundaries in Feature Spaces 
The fiat–bona fide opposition can be identified also in the realm of qualities. We 
                                                 
9 A detailed formal theory of truthmaking along these lines is presented in Smith (1999a). 
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distinguish first between determinate and determinable qualities, where the former 
– for example this specific shade of red – are specifications of the latter – for the 
example the quality red. We can imagine the determinates of a determinable such 
as color arranged in a quasi-spatial way, as happens in accounts of color- or tone-
space (Gärdenfors 2000, Guarino 2013, Johansson, 1989). When an object 
changes its color continuously, for instance moving through the color spectrum 
from red to violet as a result of continuous heating, we then draw fiat divisions 
along this spectrum through our use of color terms, dividing it into red, orange, 
yellow and so forth. This process is subject to a certain degree of varitaion in 
determining where the boundaries are to be drawn, for example, between different 
cultures and different specialized areas (colours of wine, hair, and so forth). 
We draw analogous fiat partitions also in spaces of variation along non-
qualitative dimensions, for example in classifying geographic entities such as 
‘strait’ and ‘river’ (Mark, Skupin & Smith 2001). The English language might 
have evolved with just one term, or three terms, comprehending the range of 
phenomena stretching between strait and river or, in French, between détroit and 
fleuve. For while the Straits of Gibraltar are certainly not a river, and the 
Mississippi River is certainly not a strait, things like the Detroit River, the Saint 
Claire River, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus are borderline cases. All are flat, 
narrow passages that ships can sail through between two larger waterbodies (lakes, 
seas), and all have net flow through them due to runoff. Is Lake Erie really a lake, 
or just a wide, deep part of the river-with-five-names that is called the St. 
Lawrence as it flows into the sea? Well, that depends on what you mean by ‘lake’. 
Quine has put forward a radical proposal according to which even classical 
conceptual distinctions drawn in metaphysics are distinctions of this fiat sort. 
Consider three scattered portions of the world made up of rabbits, of rabbit stages, 
and of undetached rabbit parts, respectively. The results of each of these partitions, 
as Quine sees it, make up when taken collectively just the same scattered portion 
of the world. The only difference ‘is in how you slice it’ (Quine 1969: 32). What 
he means, in our terms, is that the conceptual divisions between continuants, 
stages and undetached parts are mere products of fiat. Since reference is 
behaviorally inscrutable as concerns such distinctions, Quine concludes that there 
is no fact of the matter that they might reflect – no fact of the matter on the side of 
the objects themselves as these existed before they were addressed in our 
language. Continuants, parts and stages do not differ from each other in virtue of 
any corresponding (bona fide) differences on the side of the corresponding entities 
in reality. Rather they differ from each other in the way in which, when asked to 
count the number of objects in the fruit bowl, you can say either: ‘one orange’, or 
‘two orange-halves’, or ‘four orange-quarters’, and so on – and you will give the 
right answer in each case. The distinctions in question are merely the products of 
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our fiat partitions of one and the same reality.  
But note that Quine is being too hasty when he affirms in defense of his thesis 
of ‘ontological relativity’ that there is no ontological fact of the matter as concerns 
the reality to which we are related when using singular referring terms. For it 
follows from his own doctrine that it is a fact of the matter that this reality is 
intrinsically undifferentiated as far as the mentioned ontological distinctions are 
concerned. This is just the other side of the coin from the fact that the 
corresponding boundaries are on his view entirely fiat in nature. This putative 
ontological fact of the matter, however, faces problems. For it is itself a 
presupposition of the thesis of ontological relativity to the effect that there are no 
ontological facts of the matter. 
Quine comes close to a view according to which all boundaries on the side of 
objects in reality are of the fiat sort. Objects of reference, for him, can comprise 
any content of some portion of spacetime, however heterogeneous, disconnected 
and gerrymandered this may be. For us, on the other hand, there are some ways of 
referring to things and processes that track bona fide boundaries in reality and 
others that do not. It is the job of fundamental science to move us in the direction 
of such bona fide joints of reality, though even when science has completed this 
job there will of course still be room for delineations of the lesser sort, which track 
boundaries – for example of Quebec, of  the 70 mph zone on the highway, or of 
the No Smoking Section of your favorite restaurant – which exist only as a result 
of our acts of fiat.  
6. Jeffersonian Fiats 
When Jefferson first drew his map of proposed states of the Northwest Territory in 
1784 (see Figure 1), drawing off 14 neat checkerboard squares between the 
boundaries of the Atlantic colonies and the Mississippi River, his result was 
sufficiently inaccurate that it did not even have the Great Lakes in the right place. 
In the end, 10 states were nonetheless created in this area, having boundaries that 
follow Jefferson’s lines in large degree.  
Delineations such as these can be effective in creating objects in the 
geospatial realm only if the pertinent boundaries are, in the jargon of topology, 
Jordan curves (broadly: the boundary of a geopolitical or administrative entity 
must be free of gaps and must nowhere intersect itself). They are effected from the 
top down in the sense that there are no units or elements from out of which the 
corresponding fiat entities could be seen as being constructed in analogy with the 
way in which sets are constructed out of their members.  
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Figure 1: Map of proposed states of the Northwest Territory, 
drawn by Thomas Jefferson in 1784 
 
This is because geographers deal with regions of different shapes and sizes, 
and with sub-regions of these regions, and with the ways these regions and sub-
regions overlap or fail to overlap (Casati and Varzi 1999). They deal, in other 
words, with a mereologically-structured world. Some of Jefferson’s delineations 
correspond to bona fide boundaries: river-banks, coastlines, and the like. These are 
boundaries in the things themselves, and they would exist (and did indeed already 
exist) even in the absence of all delineating or conceptualizing activity on our or 
Jefferson’s part. Many borders of political and administrative units in the North-
American continent correspond to no genuine heterogeneity on the side of the 
bounded entities themselves.  
Often, of course, such boundaries do in course of time come to involve 
boundary-markers: walls, barbed-wire-fences, border-posts, watch-towers, and the 
like, and these will sometimes replace what is initially a fiat boundary with 
something more tangible, something physical. Fiat and bona fide objects are 
interrelated also epistemologically. Thus in cadastral practice certain objects, for 
example surveyors’ pegs placed to establish a boundary, enjoy a privileged status 
in determining at later times where the boundary lies. This means that there are 
laws governing the use of such objects, as also of posts, walls, fences and so forth, 
as evidence of boundary location, laws for example having the effect of limiting 
the degree to which walls may be moved when rebuilt. Such laws institute a new 
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layer of fiat boundaries, attached to the primary layer and constituting surrounding 
fiat zones of tolerance.  
But however arbitrary a given geospatial demarcation might be, there are 
reasons of a non-arbitrary sort why these and those fiat boundaries are created 
rather than others. Thus it was a complex medley of considerations relating to 
shipping, trade winds, harbors, climate, markets, and so on, which led our 
ancestors to create the fiat region called ‘the North Sea’ in a way which could not 
just as well have motivated them to create what would have been called, say, ‘the 
Middle Sea’ stretching between the Bermudas, the Azores, and Gotland. As 
already noted, fiat boundaries in general owe their existence not merely to human 
fiat but also to associated real properties of the relevant factual material (they are 
functions of affordances, in Gibson’s terms). As demarcated in mesoscopic 
(geographical) reality they are in every case linked to bona fide objects at various 
scales without which the relevant demarcations could not be effected at all. It is 
already for this reason a confusion to suppose that all objects (or all mesoscopic 
objects) might be in some sense of the fiat type. As the reports of boundary 
commissions make abundantly clear, the very possibility of fiat demarcation 
presupposes the existence of bona fide landmarks in relation to which fiat 
boundaries can be initially specified and subsequently re-located.  
It is interesting in this respect to consider the question when an imaginary 
mathematical line (a fiat boundary) was first recognized as a political limit 
separating two territories. In his The Renaissance Rebirth of Linear Perspective 
(Edgerton 1975: 115), Edgerton describes how, during the wars of 1420, a 
longitudinal line was proposed as the boundary between the two states of Milan 
and Florence. The reference is to the treaty between Filippo Maria and Florence 
dated February 8, 1420, which designated the ideal line connecting Magra and 
Panaro as the limit of their respective spheres of influence (which themselves 
referred back to another treaty, from 1353, where Milan and Florence each agreed 
to stay out of the affairs of Tuscany and Lombardy). It is however very unlikely 
that this line was a true boundary between the two territories. Thus the question as 
to the first genuine geopolitical fiat boundary remains unresolved. 
7. Vagueness, Gluts, and Intervolvements 
As already pointed out, geographical fiat objects will in general have boundaries 
that involve a combination of bona fide and fiat elements. The shores of the North 
Sea are bona fide boundaries, but we conceive the North Sea as a fiat object 
nonetheless, because where it abuts the Atlantic it has a boundary of a non-bona 
fide sort. The status of the latter is noteworthy in that there seem to be few 
practical consequences that turn on the issue as to where, precisely, it lies. Political 
boundaries were once themselves standardly created in places (mountain ridges, 
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middles of rivers, marshes, swamps, deserts) where there is little human activity 
and thus little chance or occasion to look into their exact location. 
Something similar holds also in regard to many geographical boundaries of a 
non-political sort – for example, the boundary between a hill and an associated 
valley. The treatment of such cases requires a further opposition between crisp and 
indeterminate boundaries. Spatial entities such as deserts, valleys, mountains, 
noses, tails are delineated not by crisp outer boundaries but rather (on some sides 
at least) by boundary-like regions which are to some degree indeterminate. We 
here leave open the question whether bona fide reality involves both and scruffy 
(fuzzy, hazy, indeterminate) entities as part of its ultimate furniture. Here 
vagueness will be seen as matter of semantics. If you point to an irregularly shaped 
protuberance in the sand and say ‘dune’, then the correlate of your expression is a 
fiat object whose constituent unitary parts are comprehended through your idea of 
what a dune is. The vagueness of this idea is responsible for the vagueness with 
which the referent of your expression is picked out. And what this means is that 
each one of a variety of overlapping determinate portions of reality has an equal 
claim to being such a referent.  
The above corresponds to the so-called supervaluationist account of 
vagueness (Fine 1975; McGee 1997; Varzi 2001), which sees vagueness in terms 
of precisification, so that to say that a demarcation line is vague it to say that there 
is a multiplicity of acceptable ways of making it precise. A view along these lines 
can be sustained only if account is taken of the fact that the assignment of a range 
of candidate-precisified referents to a given expression is dependent on the context 
in which that expression is used. This is because the degree of vagueness we can 
comfortably allow in our delineations varies inversely with the degree to which a 
given boundary is of practical relevance – and what is and is not of practical 
relevance is of course such as to vary from one context to another (Bittner & 
Smith, 2001, 2003, 2003a; Smith and Brogaard, 2003).  
When you have a map, and it has a shoreline with ins and outs, and on the 
water adjacent to one of the ins is a label saying ‘Baie d’Ecaigrain’, it is fairly easy 
for a human to see where the bay is. The outer boundary of the bay (seaward) is in 
most contexts irrelevant to action or practice, and thus a wide range of 
precisifications is allowed. In a context in which regulators have ceded all the 
islands (or oil) in the bay to some other country, however, a quite different and 
much narrower range will be required. Human beings can cope quite well with 
such vagueness of reference and with contextually determined reference shifts, and 
with different sorts of vagueness along different dimensions – as for instance 
where a bay is recorded as extending from there to there on the coastline, but as 
just fading off to seaward. The well-known indeterminations involved for example 
in establishing the number of lakes in Finland or the length of the coastline of 
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Norway Sarjakoski, 1996) illustrate the phenomenon whereby the range of 
admissible precisifications can vary widely – according to the purpose the 
measurements are being made, the governing regulations or the definitions or the 
measuring instruments or protocols employed. 
We can all agree that mountains, hills, ridges, capes, points, necks, brows, 
shoulders, heads, knees, shanks, rumps, pockets, fronts, backs, pits are real; and 
that it is obvious where the top of a mountain or the end of a cape is to be found. 
The crisply determined features of such entities – for example the heights of 
mountains – can be looked up in reference books. But where is the boundary of 
Cape Flattery on the inland side? Where is the boundary of Mont Blanc (we mean 
the base of the mountain) on the French and Italian sides? (Smith & Mark, 2003) 
Modern geopolitical boundaries are distinguished in being infinitely thin 
(crisp, determinate, precise). Political and legal boundaries must, it seems, enjoy at 
least ideally and in the long run a geometrical perfection of this sort, which is to 
say that they must take up no space. For otherwise disputes would threaten to arise 
in relation to the no-man’s-lands that the boundaries themselves would then 
occupy. If a wall or river separates two distinct portions of land, then either the 
wall or the river must be split equally down the middle, or it must be assigned as a 
whole to one or other of the two parties, or it must be declared common property 
(and then there will exist two infinitely thin boundaries separating each of the two 
distinct parcels of land from the commonly owned region which divides them). 
Each adjacent pair of geopolitical boundaries (say: on the Franco-German 
border) manifests, in addition, the phenomenon of coincidence of boundaries 
which are yet not identical. The boundary of France along this border is not also 
the boundary of Germany: each points inwards towards its own respective 
territory. Contrast, in this respect, the Western boundary of the old German 
Democratic Republic or the southern border of the present Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus: here, exceptionally, no coincident twin was established, since 
the relevant neighbors did not see fit to institute a boundary of their own.10 
Moreover, as the case of Texas and the U.S.A. makes clear, distinct geopolitical 
boundaries may also coincide from within. That is, they may coincide for a part of 
their length along which they serve as boundaries on the same side. As a map of 
the states of the continental U.S.A. makes clear, the modern geopolitical ideal is a 
world of boundaries which form an irregular tessellation of each geopolitical area, 
until the boundary of each cell is the tessellation having the topology of a Jordan 
curve. 
There are departures from this ideal of a sort not to be catalogued under the 
heading of vagueness. First, there are gaps which we have discussed already above 
                                                 
10 Compare the treatment of boundaries of different plerosis in (Brentano 1988). 
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in dealing with the no man’s lands that have not yet been assigned to one 
jurisdiction or another. Today, however, almost all gaps have been eliminated via 
treaties. Gluts are a more intriguing matter. Consider the border between Germany 
and Luxemburg. Where borders between states usually run down the middle of 
water bodies, the bed and banks of the rivers Mosel, Sauer and Our belong to both 
Germany and Luxemburg, which hold them in a condominium, a status which has 
been shared by all the water bodies forming the boundary between these two 
countries since 1816, which is the year of the first written agreement on the 
boundary separating the United Netherlands from Prussia.  
An ontological status that is still more problematic is enjoyed by Lake 
Constance, which forms part of the boundary between Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland. Lake Constance is an ontological black hole in the heart of Europe, 
whose territorial status is in seemingly unresolvable limbo. While one part of the 
lake, Lake Überlingen (which is not truly a lake), belongs completely to Germany, 
the course of the border in the rest of Lake Constance has not been laid down. For 
while Switzerland holds the view that the border runs through the middle of the 
Lake, Austria and Germany are of the opinion (albeit on different grounds) that the 
lake stands in condominium of all the states on its banks. Hence no international 
treaty establishes where the borders of Switzerland, Germany, and Austria in or 
around Lake Constance lie. If you buy a ticket to cross the Lake in a Swiss railway 
station, your ticket will be valid only to the point in the middle of the Lake where, 
as the Swiss see it, their jurisdiction ends. 
8.  Scattered Fiat Objects 
The drawing of fiat boundaries can create fiat parts within larger bona fide wholes. 
But it can also, in the manner of Micronesia or Polynesia, create fiat wholes out of 
smaller bona fide parts. And then, while bona fide objects are in general 
connected, the fiat objects that are circumcluded by fiat boundaries in this way are 
scattered entities. 
There are also cases where the two distinguished factors – on the one hand the 
carving out of fiat parts, and on the other hand the gluing together of fiat wholes – 
operate in tandem, so that geographical objects are created via the fiat unification 
of disconnected parts within larger wholes, for example in coastal nations in 
whose territory islands, or portions of islands, are included.  
The Holy Roman Empire of German Nations in around 1500 serves as a nice 
example in this regard. Here ‘German Nation’ signifies one or other of some 
hundreds of kingdoms, principalities, duchies, counties (Grafschaften), prince-
bishoprics, free cities, and so forth. These were often scattered, which means that 
they included parts disconnected from each other and embedded in the interiors of 
other German Nations. Scattered fiat objects of this sort may be intervolved – 
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intercalated inside each other – in a variety of ways. Consider the case of the 
Belgian enclave of Baarle-Hertog, which is depicted, together with its neighbor, 
the Dutch community of Baarle-Nassau, in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: The Enclaves of Baarle-Hertog and Baarle-Nassau 
 
This Figure represents an area of roughly three square kilometers situated some 
five kilometers from the Dutch-Belgian border near Turnhout. The lighter shaded 
areas in the Figure represent the community of Baarle-Hertog. The small darker 
shaded areas depict the tiny Dutch enclaves of Baarle-Nassau. Each such enclave 
is surrounded by a portion of Belgian territory, which is in its turn surrounded 
once more by territory that is Dutch. This peculiar arrangement arose as a 
consequence of Dutch independence from Spain in 1648, when the Dutch border 
was defined on the basis of a long-standing feudal provincial boundary, which in 
turn featured numerous enclaves and exclaves. A strong religious divide between 
the Netherlands and Spain in 1648, coupled with rural conservatism favoring the 
status quo, together stymied all governmental attempts to exchange or cede the 
enclaved lands. The two families of enclaves around Baarle were briefly merged in 
1815 with the formation of the United Netherlands at the Congress of Vienna. But 
with the independence of Belgium in 1830, the old situation was resurrected, and 
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once again ancient provincial limits were used as the international border. Being 
unable to determine a more rational boundary than those involved in negotiating 
the 1843 Treaty of Maastricht was forced to resort to the individual determination 
of national ownership of each of 5732 plots in the two communes, yielding a 
delineation of the border that survived until 1995, when modern administration, 
infrastructure and legal systems necessitated an exacting survey which has 
cemented the existence of the enclaves in the arrangement depicted above.11 
9. Fiat and Bona Fide Boundaries in the Material Realm 
Organisms and cells are marked as fundamental units of biology by the 
coverings or membranes which extends continuously across their surfaces, allbeit 
with small apertures – such as pores, mouths, nostrils – which allow interchange of 
substances such as air and food between interior and exterior (Smith & Brogaard, 
2003a). Objects of these sorts are thus bounded by bona fide coverings, which are 
parts of the objects which they bound.12 For organisms in early phases of their 
lives, complex layered bona fide coverings have evolved with the function of 
protection, for instance against bacterial invasion, toxins and damage through 
physical force. The mammalian embryo is protected by the successive layers of 
(starting with the outermost layer): maternal epithelial covering (the outer 
protective layer formed by the mother’s skin), the uterine wall, the placenta, 
chorion, and amnion, and ultimately by the outer layer of cells of the embryo 
itself. The eggshell of a chicken similarly protects the developing chick through an 
outermost inorganic layer called the cuticle of the egg, inside which is a 
succession of organic layers including the vertical crystal, and the palisade layers 
followed by the mammillary cone, external shell membrane, internal shell 
membrane, and limiting shell membrane (Hinckel, et al., 2012). At the same time 
some 17,000 pores allow air and moisture to penetrate through these layers into 
the interior of the egg.  
Many other kinds of bona fide objects – including our own planet, starting 
with the Earth’s crust – have exteriors structured in a similar way by a bona fide 
external layers, coverings or membranes. This holds of many artifacts for instance 
of automobiles, whose aluminum alloy panels are protected by successive layers 
of paint designed to protect against weather and UV radiation damage, stone-
chipping, and so forth. Layered structures of these sorts are used also for 
protective purposes in roofs and walls, and also in highways and pavements.13  
                                                 
11 Details are presented in (Whyte 2002). See also Vinokurov (2007). 
12 They are ‘fiat object parts’ in the terminology of BFO. 
13 Up to 8 such layers of timber, chalk, stone and other materials were employed already in 
the construction of Roman roads (Flaherty, 2002, p. 226). 
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Objects such as lumps of granite do not have coverings or membranes of these 
sorts. But this does not mean that they lose their status as bona fide objects. 
Indeed, they are bona fide in just the same sense that physically distinct layers of 
an epithelium or roadway are bona fide, namely in virtue of the physical 
discontinuity between them and the substances or media that surround them. 
For all the kinds of objects discovered manifest on their outermost surfaces 
what we shall call an interface. There is an interface between a block of granite 
and the surrounding air. There is an interface between any two adjacent layers in a 
multi-layered structure. And there is an interface between an outermost layer and 
the surrounding medium and between the innermost layer in a protective layered 
structure and the enclosed medium surrounding the protected organism. Stroll, in 
his book on Surfaces (1988, pp. 44f.), calls such interfaces ‘Leonardo surfaces’ – 
drawing on the discussion in Leonardo’s Notebooks of a surface as ‘the common 
boundary of two things that are in contact’, for example the boundary between the 
air and sea. For Stroll, as for Leonardo, surfaces are without bulk – as contrasted 
with the associated bulky portions of matter, which they are the surfaces of. For us 
here, however, interfaces are not perfectly thin zones at the exteriors of bona fide 
objects where microparticles may be such that their belongingness to one or other 
of the interfacing objects is only statistically specifiable. 
A general theory such matters is provided by J. J. Gibson in his Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception (1979), in terms of a trichotomy of substance, 
surface and medium. As he puts it, where any two of solid, liquid and gas come 
into contact there is constituted a surface (Gibson, 1979: 16). Portions of liquid 
and gas serve as media with four characteristics that are of relevance to animal 
motion and perception: 
1. detached solid bodies can move through them without resistance, and they 
thus afford locomotion,  
2. they are generally transparent, transmitting light, and thus afford vision,  
3. they transmit vibration or pressure, and thus afford auditory perception 
4. they allow rapid chemical diffusion, thus affording olfactory perception 
(detection of a substance from a distance)  
 
Light, sound and smell together guide and control motion, and as the animal 
moves it is tuned to the information contained in its environment, about things that 
reflect light, vibrate, or are volatile. They allow the animal to detect places that 
afford eating, to sniff out allies and predators, and so forth. More generally the 
animal is endowed with the ability to perceive objects, persons, and places (for 
example water holes) as persisting entities that can be detected and tracked. The 
animal is attuned to its surrounding environment along salient dimensions; its 
perceptual system thereby becomes immediately sensitized to salient differences in 
19 
its environment. As Gibson puts it, ‘it resonates to the invariant structure’ – it is 
able to simply extract salient invariants from the flowing array (op. cit., pp. 249, 
255). To recognize a facial gesture immediately and spontaneously as welcoming 
or antagonistic, to gauge the movement of vehicles approaching an intersection in 
such a way as to assess immediately and spontaneously whether it is safe for you 
to cross the intersection with your own vehicle. 
The environment, and the affordances, of a dragonfly or a water strider are of 
course very different from those of fish or human beings. On some readings of 
Gibson, this is taken to imply a relativistic view on Gibson’s part, according to 
which organisms of different species live in different worlds (Katz, 1987; compare 
Smith, 2009). Water, for example, is a substance in one world and a medium in 
another. Katz infers from this that one could never say what water is, without 
saying for whom it is, and conversely (1987, p. 120). Gibson himself expresses the 
matter as follows: 
The natural environment offers many ways of life, and different animals have 
different ways of life. The niche implies a kind of animal, and the animal implies 
a kind of niche. Note the complementarity of the two. But note also that the 
environment as a whole with its unlimited possibilities existed prior to animals. 
The physical, chemical, meteorological, and geological conditions of the surface 
of the earth and the pre-existence of plant life are what make animal life possible. 
They had to be invariant for animals to evolve. (Op. cit., p. 128) 
Here, therefore, Gibson embraces a realist perspective, according to which 
there is a common world, and a common space, and a common set of feature-
spaces to which all species-specific niches and all associated collections of 
affordances belong. This common space (as we may here assume) is a continuum, 
and like all continua it can be partitioned in a range of different ways. From this 
perspective the various conflicting ‘perceptual spaces’ are compatible; they reflect 
distinct partitions, roughly: partitions at different levels of granularity, of one and 
the same reality (Bittner and Smith 2003). With each of these partitions there is 
associated a family of affordances which ground relational dispositions linking 
animals to their external environments and to each other: 
What the male affords the female is reciprocal to what the female affords the 
male; what the infant affords the mother is reciprocal to what the mother affords 
the infant; what the prey affords the predator goes along with what the predator 
affords the prey; what the buyer affords the seller cannot be separated from what 
the seller affords the buyser, and so on. The perceiving of these mutual 
affordances is enormously complex, but it is nonetheless lawful, and it is based on 
the pickup of the information in touch, sound, odor, taste, and ambient light. 
(Gibson, 1979, p. 135) 
The demarcations associated with such mutual affordances bring into being zones 
of different sorts (Smith & Varzi, 2002), for example bubble-like zones around 
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each person in a public area, forming what is called their personal space, which 
other persons (for examples persons of one or other sex) may or may not be 
allowed to penetrate; zones created where persons interact sexually in given 
environments which demarcate, for example, those parts of the body for which 
touching is permissible, from those parts of the body that are not permissible to 
touch; zones in which an infant is allowed to play freely; zones in which a 
potential prey can feel itself secure from encroachments by its predators; zones in 
a department store which demarcate areas where only very expensive products are 
for sale (sometimes including locked cabinets) from other zones with cheaper 
products, and so forth. 
 
5. Fiat objects in BFO 
One application of the fiat/bona fide opposition is in the field of applied 
ontology, where it serves as one pillar of the treatment of spatial entities in Basic 
Formal Ontology (BFO), a top-level ontology that forms the shared architecture of 
some three hundred ontology initiatives in a range of different domains (Arp, 
Smith & Spear, 2015).  
The spatial ontology in early versions of BFO is illustrated in Figure 3.14 Here 
continuant entities are divided into spatial regions on the one hand and 
independent continuants on the other, the latter being divided further into five 
subcategories, as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3: Independent continuant and its subcategories in BFO 1.1. 
                                                 
14 Arp & Smith, 2001; see also http://basic-formal-ontology.org/, last accessed January 1, 
2019. 
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The term ‘Object’, in BFO, means bona fide object, in other words: mind-
independent, material unit, whether natural or artefactual. Objects in this sense 
include organisms, artifacts such as laptops or screwdrivers, and unitary portions 
of matter such as molecules, planets and lumps of stone. Some objects (for 
example, multicellular organisms) may have other objects (for example, cells) as 
parts. Objects do not merge continuously into each other. Two objects may be 
contingently adjacent to each other, as for instance in the case of adjacent cells in 
your body; they may also be contingently connected, as for instance in the case of 
a lamp connected to a wall by means of an electric cable, or of a neuron connected 
to a second neuron through a synapse. Objects behave to a large degree 
independently, and have their own types of causal unity – for example of the sorts 
characteristic of organisms, artifacts, and solid portions of matter (Smith, 2012a). 
BFO does not have a special term for ‘bona fide object’, since all objects are bona 
fide. But there status as such derives not from any special character of their 
boundary but rather from their type of causal unity as defined in this paper.15 
Fiat object parts are entities carved out within the interiors of objects by 
means of fiat boundaries. Object aggregates are collections of objects, for example 
teams, committees, populations, products in a warehouse. Sites are for instance 
cavities, trenches, tunnels – entities within which objects can be situated.  
The spatial ontology in the current version of BFO, (see Figure 3), includes in 
addition to the existing spatial region subcategories also three categories of what 
are called ‘continuant fiat boundaries’, namely: fiat point, fiat line, and fiat 
surface, which together replace the term ‘boundary’ that was used in earlier 
versions. This not because the new version of BFO rests on a presupposition to the 
effect that all continuant boundaries are fiat in nature. Rather it reflects the 
recognition of the fact that the apparent boundaries of, for example, organisms are 
not simple, static two-dimensional surfaces but rather complex cloud-like 
formations of moving microparticles. The boundaries we assign to organisms and 
the other three-dimensional entities that we perceive in everyday experience and 
whose dimensions we record in measurements are, therefore, fiat boundaries in the 
originally intended sense; they are boundaries that we create by a process 
analogous to one of precisification. This does not mean that the objects that they 
bound are fiat also. The fact that we cannot determine precisely, for example, the 
location of the boundary of the planet Earth, does not mean that the planet Early is 
not a separate, mind-independent material entity. The BFO treatment of the 
external boundaries of objects as viewed under the new dispensation reads as 
follows. First, when we measure the boundaries of such objects, then we impute to 
                                                 
15 Note that the account, there, is deliberately open-ended: thus further sorts of causal unity 
might be documented by BFO in due course. 
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them fiat boundaries (in ways to be described below), and all spatial measurement 
data pertain to fiat boundaries of this sort. Whether such boundaries correspond to 
bona fide boundaries – to what we might think of as joints in reality – is a complex 
question the answer to which must be decided anew for each sort of case.  
Certainly the boundaries between planets, or between apples and oranges, or 
between free oxygen molecules, do reflect joints in reality. But other cases are 
more difficult. Consider for example the boundaries for example between the 
various layers of sealcoating and asphalt on a highway. Where microscopic 
examination of such layers are bonded together chemically, then the boundary 
between them is fiat in nature; where, for example two steel plates are bolted 
together, then the boundary between them is bona fide, and something similar 
holds at the exteriors of solid bodies, for example at the interface between a lump 
of granite and the surrounding mass of air. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Independent continuant and its subcategories in BFO-ISO. 
 
The paradigmatic examples of continuant fiat boundaries in BFO are the 
North Pole (a fiat point), the Equator (a fiat line), and the plane separating the 
Northern from the Southern hemisphere (a fiat surface). Other examples are: the 
center of mass of a solid body; isobars, isotherms and isohyets; Utah. When a land 
surveyor draws lines on a map he projects these lines onto reality – treats reality as 
if it contained fiat lines of a corresponding sort. When we use a ruler to measure 
the distance between two points then we create (roughly: in our imagination) a fiat 
line connecting these points, and we position the edge of the ruler to coincide with 
this fiat line. For practical purposes we substitute for the physical edge of the ruler 
(again in our imagination) a fiat boundary (we imagine the edge of the ruler as a 
fiat line). Similarly, when we observe the meniscus of a mercury column in a 
thermometer, and compare what we imagine to be its point of maximal height to 
the scale of the thermometer, then we treat the latter as consisting of a series of fiat 
lines of infinite thinness and when the meniscus level falls between two such lines 
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then we imagine a further such fiat line to be interpolated at the appropriate 
distance between them. In all such cases our pervception, imagination and 
interpolation are subject to the constraints of our visual acuity, the resolution of 
our measuring apparatus, and so forth.  
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